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More than a decade of neuroimaging research has established that anterior and posterior
cortical midline regions are consistently recruited during self-referential thinking. These
regions are engaged under conditions of directed cognition, such as during explicit self-
reference tasks, as well as during spontaneous cognition, such as under conditions of rest.
One of the many issues that remain to be clarified regarding the relationship between
self-referential thinking and cortical midline activity is the functional specificity of these
regions with regard to the nature of self-representation and processing.The functional pro-
file associated with the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) is the focus of the current article.
What is specifically explored is the idea that personal relevance or personal significance
is a central factor that impacts how brain activity is modulated within this cortical mid-
line region. The proactive, imaginative, and predictive nature of function in the mPFC is
examined by evaluating studies of spontaneously directed cognition, which is triggered by
stimulus-associated personal relevance.
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“Reality leaves a lot to the imagination.”
(John Lennon)
More than a decade has passed since the publication of the first
neuroimaging study of self-referential thinking (Kircher et al.,
2000). The original finding of the involvement of cortical mid-
line structures (CMS), such as medial prefrontal and poste-
rior cingulate areas, have been corroborated numerous times
since then (Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004; Qin and Northoff,
2011).
The CMS are part of a larger network of areas, commonly
referred to as the default mode network (DMN),which are engaged
not only during self-referential thought but also during men-
tal state reasoning, autobiographical memory retrieval, episodic
future thinking, and moral decision making (Buckner et al.,
2008). This has led to several (sometimes overlapping) hypothe-
ses regarding the function of this network as involving either
self-projection (Buckner and Carroll, 2007), scene construction
(Hassabis and Maguire, 2009), constructive episodic simulation
(Schacter et al., 2008), or self-relatedness evaluation (Legrand and
Ruby, 2009).
Among the many unanswered questions in this research
domain is the functional specificity of each of these regions
vis-à-vis the self, given the wide range of social and self-
relevant contexts in which this network is activated. The objec-
tive in this article is explore the potential role of the ven-
tral (including anterior) aspects of the medial prefrontal cor-
tex (mPFC; dominantly corresponding to Brodmann Areas 10,
32, 11, and 12) in coding for personal relevance or signifi-
cance, which can be triggered either externally (explicitly or
implicitly stimulus-associated) and/or internally (such as during
stimulus-independent thought)1.
SELF-RELATEDNESS AND THE mPFC
The idea that the mPFC is responsive as a function of the degree
of self-relatedness is not new. In general, the closer the similarity
between oneself and another person, the stronger the activation in
the mPFC when processing information related to these protag-
onists, as well as the more ventral the engagement of the mPFC
(Mitchell et al., 2006). This pattern of findings has been reported
across a range of contexts in which explicit evaluations concerning
self and others are made (van der Meer et al., 2010; Murray et al.,
2012).
Much of the discourse in the field focuses on parallels and
distinctions between neurocognition underlying such kinds of
“explicit self-reference” in comparison to “default mode self-
reference”(Whitfield-Gabrieli et al., 2011). The latter occurs under
conditions of rest or low cognitive demand. However, the ven-
tral mPFC is also selectively engaged in other contexts that are
implicit in nature, and in which no explicit self-relatedness judg-
ments are required (Moran et al., 2009; Seitz et al., 2009; Rameson
et al., 2010). For instance, the mPFC was responsive to angry body
expressions only when a stranger’s body was directly facing oneself,
but not when it was turned away (Grèzes et al., 2012). Research
on reputation processing has revealed enhanced activity in the
mPFC during self-referential thinking in the presence of observers
1The focus of this paper is limited to frontal cortical midline structures as evi-
dence showing that activity in posterior midline regions, such as the precuneus,
posterior cingulate, and retrosplenial cortices, are modulated by self-relatedness,
self-relevance, personal relevance, and/or personal significance is not as clear-cut.
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compared to when the participants were unobserved (Izuma et al.,
2010). Findings from the ERP literature have also demonstrated
that the degree of self-relevance (low, moderate, high, non-self)
associated with names of persons or places that were presented
to participants, modulated P2 activity, which indexes enhanced
attentional recruitment, and P3 activity, which indexes increased
cognitive processing (Chen et al., 2011). Moreover, P3 activity, that
was elicited when hearing one’s own name, was found to be pos-
itively correlated with the degree of brain activity in the mPFC
(Perrin et al., 2005).
Such implicit contexts are not equivalent to those of explicit
self-reference and default mode self-reference. This is because
they involve stimulus-induced self-reference which leads to spon-
taneous cognition that is not necessarily task-relevant (in that it
is not necessary to process the stimuli in a self-referential man-
ner in order to successfully perform the task). As such contexts
are broader than those involving “self-relatedness,” the term “self-
relevance” is commonly adopted as it more accurately captures
the function associated with ventral mPFC activity. Indeed, this
fits with dominant ideas in the field regarding the function of
this brain region as mediating the “identification and appraisal
of stimulus-induced self relevance” (author’s italics) (Schmitz and
Johnson, 2006, 2007). In contrast, dorsal regions of the mPFC are
held to mediate “cognitive control in the generation of explicitly
self-referential decisions” (Schmitz and Johnson, 2007).
One question that arises in this context is whether such identifi-
cation and appraisal processes that trigger spontaneous cognition
are also recruited when evaluating contexts that may be personally
significant but where the “self” is not directly involved. How does
the concept of self-relevance differ from that of personal relevance?
THE CASE FOR PERSONAL RELEVANCE
The word “self” is immediately suggestive of a strong link to one’s
subjective or personal identity, such as the knowledge of one’s abil-
ities and skills, personality attributes, preferences, and so on. The
object in question in such cases is the “self as I” or the “self as
me” (James, 1891). For instance, answering the question “Would
you describe yourself as ambitious?” would more actively require
you to evaluate this statement in terms of your own self concept
than questions such as “Would you describe Barack Obama as
ambitious?” or “Would you describe Cinderella as ambitious?”
The concepts of “self-relatedness” or “self-relevance” may apply
prima facie in contexts related to highly similar or related others
(e.g., one’s mother) as such entities are obviously relevant with
regard to one’s own self-identity. However, there are several situa-
tions in which the applicability or generalizability of such concepts
are not as clear-cut. For instance, my favorite coffee mug may be
personally relevant to me, but not necessarily self-relevant in the
strict sense of being part of my core self-identity. So the concept of
“personal relevance” is not entirely synonymous with that of “self-
relevance” as it can be applied to a wider range of situations. So
what is evidence is there for the modulation of the ventral mPFC
as a function of personal relevance?
Investigations of how we make reality-fiction distinctions pro-
vide some insight into this question. In the first of these studies
(Abraham et al., 2008), participants were presented with sentences
in which a real person engaged with either a known real entity
(e.g., George Bush) or a fictional entity (e.g., Cinderella) in infor-
mative (e.g., heard about) or interactive contexts (e.g., spoke to).
Following this, subjects had to determine whether this scenario
was possible or not given the constraints of our real world. Pro-
cessing information about real people led to activations in two
brain regions, the anterior mPFC and the posterior cingulate
cortex (PCC).
The findings from this explorative study were interpreted in
terms of the functional profile associated with these brain regions.
Their engagement was postulated to reflect the stimulus-induced
spontaneous access and integration of many different kinds of
internally generated information (episodic, self-referential, vis-
ceral, etc.). Even in the absence of an externally directed behavioral
goal that imposes such demands, this information is automat-
ically accessed with the introduction of a familiar entity into
one’s stream of consciousness. The greater the familiarity, the
higher the personal relevance. Activity in these brain regions was
therefore held to be spontaneously modulated by the degree of
stimulus-associated personal relevance.
The basic premise was that reality (relative to fiction) is
processed in terms of subjectively coded representations in the
brain. This was attributed to the fact that, among the major dif-
ferences between familiar famous people and fictional characters,
is the amount of information that we can readily draw upon in
reference to them and the frequency with which we encounter
information regarding them in our daily lives. For instance, we are
regularly bombarded with information concerning famous peo-
ple through the media. Even if we are not likely to encounter these
people in reality, they nevertheless occupy a significant space in
our social world, unlike fictional characters.
Moreover, although we can arrive at quite a detailed under-
standing of a fictional world (such as that of Cinderella), we still
have, relatively speaking, very limited information about her world
in comparison to what we know about our own world. With a
famous real entity, such as George Bush, one has access to dif-
ferent types of information about him: the degree of perceived
attractiveness, his position in the social hierarchy, the degree of
influence his politics has had on one’s own life and that of others,
what moral values he stands for, one’s personal feelings toward him
(e.g., like/dislike, respect/irreverence), the last time one saw him
on television or read about him in the newspaper, etc. So read-
ing about a familiar entity, via stimulus-induction, leads to the
spontaneous access, integration, and coordination of many dif-
ferent kinds of information (e.g., semantic, episodic, emotional,
self-referential, evaluative, interoceptive), even if this information
is unnecessary for the task at hand. In fact, the role of the mPFC has
been documented in research on salience processing and valuation,
particularly in the presence of personal involvement (Somerville
et al., 2010; Roy et al., 2012).
These ad hoc speculations were corroborated in a follow-up
fMRI study (Abraham and von Cramon, 2009). Familiar individ-
uals within our sociocultural world, such as celebrities or cultural
icons, would be expected to be more relevant to us compared
to fictional characters because they occupy a real space in our
shared social world. But individuals who are part of our inti-
mate circle of family and friends would be even more personally
significant as their actions have a direct bearing on our lives. If the
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mPFC codes for personal relevance, the activation profile seen in
this brain region when processing information concerning friends
(high relevance), famous people (medium relevance) and fictional
characters (low relevance) should vary accordingly. The fMRI
results confirmed these expectations as the anterior and ventral
mPFC was most strongly engaged during high relevance contexts
(e.g., involving one’s mother), moderately engaged in medium rel-
evance contexts (e.g., involving George Bush) and least engaged in
low relevance contexts (e.g., involving Cinderella) (Abraham and
von Cramon, 2009).
This ties in well with other work that has shown that ven-
tral aspects of the mPFC are engaged when making judgments
about others who are similar to us in terms of sociopolitical views
(Mitchell et al., 2006), and who are socially relevant to us (Krienen
et al., 2010). Merely considering the perspectives of one’s own
preferred candidate relative to that of the opponent prior to the
2008 US presidential elections was reflected in a greater mPFC
activity (Falk et al., 2012). Moreover, research in the field of cul-
tural neuroscience has revealed that compared to participants of
Western origin, the mPFC was more strongly engaged in Chinese
participants, not only during self-referential processing, but also
during information processing related to one’s mother (Zhu et al.,
2007). The rationale offered for this pattern of findings was that
China represents an interdependent culture where the concep-
tual representations of close others are more personally significant
than in the case of independent cultures, such as that of Western
Europe. Conceptual representations of close others are hence more
tightly coupled to conceptual representations of oneself within the
semantic networks of people from interdependent cultures relative
to those from independent cultures.
While each of the aforementioned investigations tapped some
form of explicit self-reference (self-relatedness or self-relevance
based), the reality-fiction distinction studies were implicit inves-
tigations of personal relevance (Abraham et al., 2008; Abraham
and von Cramon, 2009). This is because neither self-referential
nor close-other-referential judgments with reference to one’s self
concept were necessary for task completion, and the self concept
was not passively or indirectly evoked (through one’s own name
or through egocentric perspective taking).
As such, the findings revealed that the anterior ventral mPFC
is spontaneously modulated by the degree of stimulus-associated
personal relevance. Indeed, this fits with the functional pro-
file associated with this region as the constructive processes
orchestrated by anterior regions of the ventral mPFC have been
highlighted as “. . . one of combining elemental units of infor-
mation – from sensory systems, interoceptive cues, long-term
memory – into a gestalt representation of how an organism is
situated in its environment, which then drives predictions about
future events” (Roy et al., 2012).
A powerful demonstration of this principle was reported in a
recent article where the influence of personal significance on per-
ception was investigated by having participants tag neutral shapes
(e.g., triangle) with labels for themselves, their best friend, or an
unfamiliar other (Sui et al., 2013). Self-tagged responses were asso-
ciated with greater activity in the ventral mPFC and conferred
significant behavioral advantages in terms of response speed. This
finding of ventral mPFC involvement even in the context of a novel
and arbitrary association between neutral stimuli and personal sig-
nificance builds on previous work where enhanced memory effects
(Cunningham et al., 2011) as well as greater mPFC engagement
(Kim and Johnson, 2012) were observed for even transitory self-
object associations. Together, these findings correspond well to
the idea that personal significance is automatically encoded in the
brain and modulates information processing accordingly (Roye
et al., 2007).
CONCLUSION
The central proposal of this article is that the ventral mPFC is
responsive as a function of personal relevance. One of the criti-
cal factors to note here is that although the engagement of this
brain region is “stimulus-induced,” its function cannot be merely
explained in terms of explicit self-relevant or self-related task
demands. The ventral mPFC is not only involved in explicit con-
texts, where subjects generate conscious evaluations of oneself or
close others, but also in implicit contexts, where, although self-
relevant stimuli are presented, no self-referential judgments need
to be made (Abraham and von Cramon, 2009; Moran et al., 2009).
This illustrates not only the proactive and predictive nature of
information processing in the brain (Bar, 2009; Bubic et al., 2010),
but also the fact that stimulus-induced spontaneous modulations
of the brain can be used to understand such dynamic facets of
neurocognitive function.
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